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And, yet, it is never observed, and all quantifications add up without room for it in the mix.

In short, it is the invisible dragon in your garage whose breath gives off no heat. You’re welcome to sit down and have a nice chat with it over a beer and a toke, but you shouldn’t be surprised when nobody takes you seriously.

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Given mathematics, the next philosophical step for the science-inclined is the problem of induction. This can be resolved by taking as an axiom that experience has some pattern, yielding a theorem formalizing Occam’s Razor and with an algorithm implied which resembles science, providing a quasi-effective resolution of the problem of induction. (Refutation gives an alternative axiom, but seems to lead to a philosophical dead end at Ramsey Theory and Boltzman Brains.) Formally, “pattern” translates to “pattern recognizable by an ordinal degree of hypercomputation”; the Turing principle thus results from either an explicit assumption of an ordinal of zero, or a provisional inference that hypercomputation doesn’t yet make any empirical explanations (formally) simpler. Or in short: it’s easier to just take an arbitrary axiom than invoke the “Omega Point”.

“Moral truth” is something of the flip side from logic and mathematics. Rather than being an implicit prior needed for answering of is-questions, moral orderings (EG: better or worse) for choices implicitly requires first answering is questions — particularly, “What are the choices?” While the existence of such orderings can be shown constructively, and humans have some tendencies in choice orderings, the question of which of the possible choice orderings the word “ought” references and the question of whether these human tendencies are “true” are non-empirical. Both require an additional axiom, to indicate which ought-ordering is meant; essentially, Hume’s is-ought problem.

So… logical, mathematical, and moral truth are arguments only effective against naturalism’s most naive forms and against moderately doltish adherents. (The most doltish tend not to understand the argument, and the least doltish tend to spot flaws.)

So to think that the “God phenomenon” has to be a closed system who obeys to the laws of conservation is a very good way to not find it…

(Anticipating one possible objection: the Enlightenment was a Christian movement in much the same way as the Protestant Reformation was a Catholic movement.)